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Abstract
This paper analyzes the empirical relationship between market structure
and price dispersion in the airline markets connecting the UK and the Republic
of Ireland. Price dispersion is measured by a number of inequality indexes,
calculated using fares posted on the Internet at specific days before takeoff. We
find a negative correlation between market dominance and price dispersion;
thus competition appears to hinder the airlines’ ability to price discriminate
to exploit consumers’ heterogeneity in booking time preferences. Moreover,
in the Christmas and Easter periods of high demand, fares are less dispersed,
possibly because airlines target a less heterogenous set of consumers.
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1 Introduction
Airline pricing represents perhaps the most common violation of the law of one price.
Borenstein and Rose (1994) were the first to show that the expected difference in
price paid by two randomly selected passengers on a U.S. route is about 36% of the
airline’s mean price on the route. Other studies have derived alternative estimates
highlighting an increasing trend in the amount of dispersion characterizing the U.S.
airline markets (Hayes and Ross, 1998, Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). The exclusive
use of the Internet as a marketing and distribution channel made by the largest Low
Cost airlines operating in the European markets appears to have intensified this
phenomenon (Piga and Bachis, 2007).
Fare dispersion arises because airlines engage in price discrimination strategies,
which consist in dividing passengers according to their price elasticity and charging
them a different fare.1 The keys to identify and hence segment passengers can be
various: advance purchase requirement, Saturday night stay over, frequent flyer
programme (Stavins, 2001). Among all these categories, this paper focuses on the
price discrimination based on how many days in advance passengers are willing to
book their flight and to the consequent price dispersion that is generated. We will
refer to this type of price dispersion as Intertemporal Price Dispersion (IPD) and
define it as the dispersion which arises when passengers are charged a different fare
according to their different booking day preferences.
Such a segmentation strategy may work only if passengers’ preferences are het-
erogenous, which may be induced by a different motivation to travel. Very early
bookers are those who need to reach a specific destination and have very little flex-
ibility on their departure date: their demand is thus slightly inelastic and they are
willing to pay a moderately high price to secure a place on a specific plane.2 Early-
intermediate bookers are normally those who do not fix their departure day ex-ante
and shop around across different departure days and destinations: this substitutabil-
ity makes their demand highly elastic.3 Finally, last-minute bookers are generally
those whose choice of destinations and travel dates are fixed, so that they are more
likely to be willing to pay a high fare.4
1Beside price discrimination there are also other sources of price dispersion. Under stochastic
demand pricing, for example, airlines adjust fare as demand is revealed through time. Because
capacity is fixed in advance, the amount of the fare highly depends on the probability that future
demand exceeds capacity and on the latter’s expected shadow cost. This pricing strategy may
explain some of the intertemporal price variation in a given flight. Under systematic peak load
pricing, airlines charge higher fares during the peaks of demand and lower fares during off-peaks.
For this reason business routes typically have higher fares during the week and lower fares during
the weekend, resulting in an overall high degree of price dispersion on the route.
2Think, for instance, of a family planning the Summer or Winter holiday, something which is
generally done well in advance of departure.
3This could correspond to the market for short-term breaks.
4This market segment is typically associated with passengers traveling for business purposes.
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The aim of this paper is to study empirically how such IPD practice can be
influenced by the intensity of competition on a given route. In principle we can dis-
tinguish two opposite effects, which we call “monopoly effect” and “brand effect”.5
The monopoly effect arises when a carrier can price over the marginal cost accord-
ing to its degree of market power. Under monopoly the firm is able to markup its
product with no concern about competitors undercutting their prices; under perfect
competition the firm, instead, prices at its marginal cost to retain its customers.
Therefore, in a market between these two polar cases, a lower degree of market
power should reduce the possibilities for the firm to charge different prices to dif-
ferent consumers. In particular, the monopoly effect suggests that an increase in
competition lowers the markup on the price inelastic (business) passengers to a level
more in line with the corresponding level of fares charged to price elastic (leisure)
passengers. The reduced ability to price discriminate leads to a flatter intertemporal
distribution of fares and, therefore, to less price dispersion.
The brand effect depends on the fact that imperfectly competitive markets are
multi-product or, more generally, multi-brand markets with heterogeneity in the
cross-price elasticities of demand. For this reason consumers may be segmented
according to their brand preferences. If we assume that the price inelastic passengers,
who represent the upper tail of the fare distribution, are more brand loyal than
price elastic passengers, who represent the lower tail of the fare distribution, then
increased competition reduces the markup on the lower tail to a larger extent than on
the higher tail.6 In other words the increased competition drives the lower part of the
fare distribution down, letting the upper part almost unchanged. As a consequence,
price dispersion increases as well as price discrimination.
This paper studies empirically the relationship between the price dispersion ob-
served on the UK-Irish airline markets and their structure, in order to shed some
light on which effect, monopoly or brand, predominates. We use a panel of 87,601
flight services operated between the UK and the Republic of Ireland during the pe-
riod 1st June 2003 and 31st December 2004, for a total of 614,306 price observations.
We find significant evidence that price dispersion increases with market power and,
hence, that the monopoly effect prevails on the UK-Irish airline market.
Most of the empirical contributions on price dispersion in the Civil Aviation
industry have focused, so far, mainly on the U.S. market (Borenstein, 1989; Boren-
stein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Stavins, 2001; Gerardi and Shapiro,
2009). This work contributes to the existing literature by using data on European
markets, whose deregulation was fully completed in 1997. Its ensuing effects were
manifold, but the most noticeable has been the rapid growth of the Low Cost Car-
riers (LCCs): not only they opened up new routes and new destinations, but their
low prices greatly extended demand, forcing the traditional, Full Service Carriers
5This explanation draws from Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
6See Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989) and Gale (1993).
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(FSCs) to respond by adapting their own operations and prices to compete more
effectively. The strengthening of the LCCs position is revealed, for instance, by the
fact that between June 2003 and December 2004 they operated almost 60% of the
flights between the United Kingdom and Ireland .7 In the paper we study possible
pricing differences between these two types of carriers.
Furthermore, the focus on the UK-Irish markets allows us to add further insights
on the possible effects of the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair, both
Irish carriers, which the European Union Competition Commission decided to block
arguing that the proposed acquisition would increase the market concentration and
raise serious anti-competitive concerns (European Commission, 2007). Because our
estimates indicate the predominance of the monopoly effect, the acquisition of a
competitor might have therefore facilitated the exercise of price discrimination and
harmed specific consumer segments. Implicitly, our analysis thus provides support
to the EU Competition Commission’s decision to block the merger.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section revises the
literature, section II describes the econometric model, section III presents the results,
section IV is devoted to the robustness checks, section V summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature review
In the context of introducing new products on the market, Stokey (1979) studies
whether intertemporal price discrimination between early and late adopters can
maximize the firm’s profits. Under a continuum of consumers in continuous time
and with the same discount rate for the firm and the consumers, she finds that
the profit-maximizing strategy of the firm is to charge the same price in every
period. This result, however, hinges on some assumptions, which, if relaxed, can
sustain intertemporal price discrimination. For instance if we allow consumers’ time
preferences to differ and also to affect their reservation prices, then intertemporal
price discrimination becomes a profitable strategy for the monopolist firm.8
Employing a model of advance purchases, Gale (1993) shows that the intensity
of price discrimination in a non-cooperative duopoly is higher than in a monopoly,
because the tougher competition among airlines for the less-time sensitive consumers
reduces the lower tail of the price distribution and thus generates more price disper-
sion. This finding is in line with the previous works by Borenstein (1985) and Holmes
(1989), who argue that price discrimination may be sustainable in oligopoly when
products are differentiated and consumers have brand preferences. In particular, if
7Based on our own calculations based on data provided by the UK Civil Aviation Authority
8There are also other ways in which intertemporal price discrimination can turn out to be
optimal, for example by allowing increasing marginal costs (assumed constant in the model) or
by lessening the credible pre-commitment of the firm to charge a uniform price every period. For
further examples see Varian (1989).
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the consumers’ cross-elasticity between brands is lower than the industry elasticity,
then there is some margin for the firm to segment consumers on their willingness to
pay for the brand and, hence, to implement price discrimination successfully. Under
this condition, neither increased competition nor lack of entry barriers can prevent
airlines from engaging in price discriminatory strategies.9
Gale and Holmes (1993) show that if consumers have specified time of departure
preferences, which characterize the flight to be peak and off-peak, then the firm can
use advance purchase discounts to divert some of the demand from the peak to the
off-peak period. This strategy is shown to expand the output and be superior to
uniform pricing in maximizing the profit. An important corollary is that because the
availability of discounted seats on the peak flights is very limited, off-peak flights
should show more price dispersion than peak flights. In a similar fashion, but
imposing ex ante uncertainty on which flight hits the peak of demand, Gale and
Holmes (1992) show that advance purchase discounts are to be implemented in
both types of flight (peak and off-peak) to smooth the demand peaks and reach
allocative efficiency. Under relatively similar assumptions, Dana (1999a) shows that
price dispersion arises because of stochastic demand and price rigidities, even when
the peak of demand is unknown. In his view price dispersion results from the
yield management techniques of the firm aiming to efficiently smooth the peaks of
demand.
Under demand uncertainty and high inventory holding costs, Dana (1998) demon-
strates that advance purchase discounts represent a plausible profit-maximizing
strategy, even in the absence of market power. Thus firms tend to price discriminate
consumers on the bases of their different extent of demand uncertainty rather than
on their mere willingness to pay: by practicing advance purchase discounts firms
are able to attract consumers with more certain demand first in order to reduce the
costs associated to the risk of holding unutilized capacity.
Dana (1999b) uses a model with capacity constraints and aggregate demand
uncertainty to explain price dispersion. Comparing the outcome of monopoly with
the outcome of perfect competition, he finds that prices become more dispersed as
markets become more competitive.
To sum up, the above theoretical works show that price dispersion induced by
price discriminatory strategies represents the firms’ best response to the demand
conditions and industry’s cost structure. Most importantly, price dispersion is not
necessarily associated with higher market power, as instead argued by standard
industrial economic theory.10 Indeed, the main results in Dana (1999b) point in the
opposite direction: price dispersion is expected to increase as markets become more
competitive.
Such a hypothesis is tested empirically in Borenstein and Rose (1994), where
9See Stole (2007) for further explanations.
10See Tirole (1988) for example.
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price dispersion is measured by the Gini coefficient calculated for each airline-route
pair using a ten percent random sample of all tickets originating in the USA during
the second quarter of 1986. The main findings from a set of regressions of the log-
arithm of the Gini coefficient on market structure variables, namely market share
and Herfindhal index, reveal a negative and statistically significant effect of mar-
ket concentration on price dispersion. However, in a study using three alternative
measures of price dispersion (the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the En-
tropy index), Hayes and Ross (1998) do not find a clear connection between market
structure and price dispersion. This result may be driven by the change in con-
sumers’ elasticity between the 1980s, which include the sample period of Borenstein
and Rose (1994), to the 1990s, which refer to the sample period by Hayes and Ross
(1998), and by the consequent different pricing policies of airlines. Using a similar
data set to Borenstein and Rose (1994), but working with fare as the dependent
variable in level, Borenstein (1989) regresses the 20th, 50th and 80th percentile fare
on market structure variable and on other independent variables meant to control
for cost and quality factors. He finds a positive effect of market concentration on
fare for the 20th and 50th percentile regressions while a negative effect for the 80th
percentile. Since an increase in competition appears to reduce the lower part of the
fare distribution to a larger extent than the higher part, the result by Borenstein
(1989) may be considered an empirical case in favor of the brand effect mentioned
earlier.
Stavins (2001) tests if price discrimination increases with competition on a cross
sectional sample of tickets of different US carriers for flights operated on the same
day and on different domestic routes. She controls for market structure, flight char-
acteristics, demand features and approximates price discrimination with ticket re-
strictions such as Saturday-night stay over and advance-purchase requirement. She
finds that price discrimination and price dispersion decrease with market concentra-
tion.
More recently, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) extend the work of Borenstein and
Rose (1994) using panel data from 1993 to 2006. Opposite to Borenstein and Rose
(1994), they find a negative effect of competition on fare dispersion. Furthermore,
this effect is mostly significant on routes characterized by passengers with heteroge-
nous elasticity of demand, while on routes characterized by more homogenous pas-
sengers this effect becomes largely insignificant. Their results, therefore, constitute
empirical evidence in favor of the monopoly effect.
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3 Econometric model
Our econometric approach hinges around the following reduced form model:
IPDit = µ1RMSit + µ2Flightsit + θ1Frequencyit + (1)
+θ2Departimeit + θ3ArriveDeparti + θ4Xmasit
+θ5Easterit ++δ1Companyi + δ2Routei + δ3Montht + ρi + εit;
where we control for market structure (µ parameters), flight characteristics (θ pa-
rameters), company characteristics, route characteristics and seasonality (δ param-
eters). The appendix provides a detailed description on the sources of the data.
Time t is set weekly, i represents a given flight code on a given route.
• RMS stands for Route Market Share, or simply market share, calculated by
the ratio of the monthly number of flights operated by a given airline in a
given route over the total monthly number of flights across all airlines in a
given route.11 A positive sign on RMS supports the monopoly effect, whilst a
negative sign is evidence of the brand effect. Because the majority of routes in
the sample are either a monopoly or a duopoly, this variable is highly correlated
with the Herfindhal index, which is therefore excluded from the model;
• Flights corresponds to the total number of flights across all companies operated
in a given route and in a given month.
• Frequency represents the monthly frequency of a given flight code, as flight
services can be offered daily or with less frequency, typically three times or
twice a week.
• Departime controls for the departure time of the flight. Departime is charac-
terized by four categorical dummies: Morning (if the flights take off between
h 6-10), Midday (h 10-14), Afternoon (h 14-18) and Evening (h 18-24).12
• ArriveDepart is a dummy variable equal to one if the flight originates in the
UK and equal to zero if it originates in the Republic of Ireland.
• Xmas and Easter are two dummy variables equal to one during the weeks of
Xmas/New Year and Easter respectively and equal to zero otherwise. They
identify periods of peak demands on travel dates that have no alternative.
11Employing the number of flights instead of the number of passengers reduces possible endo-
geneity problems, because the number of flights is set well before the demand is realized, generally
in the previous season. The airline’s decision on this variable may still be correlated with a route
fixed effects, an issue that we tackle using a panel fixed effects estimator.
12Note that no flights are allowed between midnight and 6 am.
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These dummies should be therefore associated with less intertemporal price
dispersion because the airlines, during such periods, can condition their pricing
strategies on the high willingness to pay of a more homogenous customer base.
• Company represents the set of company dummies, one for each airline of our
sample: Aer Lingus, Bmibaby, British Airways, MyTravelLite and Ryanair as
the omitted category.
• Month represents a set of monthly dummies capturing possible seasonality
effects.
• ρ is the flight code by route fixed effect, assumed time invariant within each
flight code.13
• ε is the standard regression error, assumed to be random with zero mean.
The dependent variable IPD is alternatively represented by three different mea-
sures of inequality: the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Entropy index.14
There are a number of advantages in using such indexes. First, they have the de-
sirable property of being scale invariant (i.e. multiplying all fares by a positive
constant does not change the value of the measure), which allows us to compare
distributions of different magnitudes. Second, because their calculation entails the
entire distribution of available fares, they are preferable to such indexes as the low-
est to highest ratio or the range, which only use two observations out of the entire
sample, and are therefore sensible to outliers. Furthermore, it may be possible that
different distribution of fares may have the same value of, e.g., the range index.
Finally, since these three indexes are already employed in previous empirical stud-
ies on airline price dispersion, they allow for result comparability with the existing
literature (see, e.g., Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Gerardi and
Shapiro, 2009).
13Because each flight code is company specific by definition, the company fixed effect is already
absorbed into ρ.
14In formulae:
Gini = 1 + 1N − 2λN2ΣNi=1 (N + 1− i)pi
Atkinson =
 1−
1
λ
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 p
1−φ
i
)1/(1−φ)
for ∀φ > 0 and φ 6= 1
1− 1λ
(∏N
i=1 pi
)1/N
for φ = 1
Entropy =

1
N
∑N
i=1
[(
pi
λ
)φ
− 1
]
for ∀φ 6= 0 and φ 6= 1
1
N
∑N
i=1
(
pi
λ
)φ
· ln pi
λ
for φ = 0 or φ = 1
where pi is the price of observation i, with i = 1, 2, ..., N ; λ is the mean price and φ is the
choice parameter. For a detailed description of these indexes see Jenkins (1991) or Cowell (1995).
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Each index places different weights to different part of the distribution. The
Gini coefficient gives more weight to the central part of the distribution while it
remains quite unaffected by the tails. The Atkinson index, on the contrary, is more
sensitive to the upper end of the distribution. This index is calculated under three
alternative choice parameters φ: 0.5, 1 and 2; higher parameters amplify the effect
of the upper tail, whilst lower parameters smooth it. Finally, the Entropy index
places more weight on the lower part of the distribution and is calculated under
three different alternative parameters φ: 0, 1 and 2; the lower the parameter, the
stronger the emphasis on the fare variation at the bottom of the distribution. Their
joint evaluation therefore provides a general and robust indication on the reliability
of the results. Most importantly, the use of different values of φ allows an indirect
evaluation of the prevalence of the effects under study: “monopoly” vs. “brand”. If
the former prevails, as φ increases we should then expect an increase in the coefficient
of the market share variable when we use the Atkinson index, and a decrease for the
Entropy index case. Viceversa if it is the latter effect to drive the airlines’ pricing.
We calculate the Gini, the Atkinson and the Entropy for each week and for each
flight code using a series of different fares posted on the internet 7, 10, 14, 21, 28,
35, 42, 49 and 56 days before the departure. Table 1 reports the summary statistics.
Overall, i.e. across all companies and all routes of our sample, the average Gini
is approximately 0.35, which implies that the expected difference in fares between
two random passengers on a given flight is on average 70 percent of the airline’s
average ticket fare.15 This result is higher than what found with US data (36 percent
in Borenstein and Rose (1994), 44 percent in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)), which
may depend on the large presence of LCCs, which traditionally show greater fare
dispersion.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the Gini coefficient by airline. We observe that
the three LCCs of our sample are associated with the three highest averages of the
Gini coefficient, while the two FSCs exhibit the two lowest.
4 Results
Equation (1) is estimated using both Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
Panel Fixed Effects (FE). The Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index, which range
between zero and one by construction, are unbound with the usual log odds ratio
transformation.16 The standard errors are clustered by route and week to control
for possible residuals’ correlation between flights of different companies serving the
15The expected absolute fare difference as a proportion of the mean fare for two passengers
randomly drawn is equal to twice the Gini coefficient.
16I.e. the log odds ratio of y is equal to log y/(1− y).
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same route and departing during the same week.17
Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (1) when IPD is represented by the
log odds ratio of the Gini and the log odds ratio of the Atkinson under its three
specifications. Table 4 completes table 3 by reporting the coefficients of equation
(1) when the Entropy index under its three specifications is the dependent variable.
From both Tables we observe a clear pattern indicating a positive and often
statistically significant impact of market share on fare dispersion. Using the FE
estimates to quantify the effect of market share on price dispersion, we obtain that
an increase of RMS by one-standard-deviation raises the Gini coefficient by 0.02, the
Atkinson index between 0.02 and 0.09, the Entropy index between 0.08 and 0.16.18
The positive sign, which is found across all 14 specifications, thus appears to
lend strong support in favor of the monopoly effect.19 That is, IPD intensifies in
more concentrated markets, possibly because concentration facilitates the extraction
of consumer surplus from last-minute passengers with an inflexible travel schedule.
Given the structure of the UK-Irish airline market, which is characterized by several
duopoly as well as monopoly routes, this effect is somehow to be expected: few
companies with a large market share on a route can easily price discriminate with
little concern about their competitors’ pricing strategies. Moreover because LCCs,
which are largely present in our sample, do not implement frequent flyer programs,
consumers have little incentives to remain loyal to an airline and hence there are
weak premises to sustain the brand effect.20
This argument is corroborated by the magnitude of the coefficients of market
share across all our indexes of IPD. Recall that the Gini coefficient gives more em-
phasis to the middle part of the distribution, the Atkinson index to the upper part
and the Entropy index to the lower part. Recall also that a higher choice param-
eter in the Atkinson index and in the Entropy index tends to amplify the effect of
17Think, for instance, of temporary shock such as a football match or a music festival: during the
week of the event airline fares are likely to peak irrespectively of the company and of the booking
period, resulting in lower fare dispersion.
18For the Gini and Atkinson models, we calculate the marginal effect of RMS on the dependent
variable evaluated at the sample mean. Formally the marginal effect stems from the following pro-
cedure. First, express equation (1) only with respect to the variable of interest, log
(
y
1−y
)
= µRMS,
where y is either the Gini coefficient or the Atkinson index. Totally differentiating yields: ∂y/∂RMS
= µy(1 − y). Second, choose the sample mean of y (see table 1), at which to evaluate ∂y/∂RMS
and consider 0.254 as one-standard-deviation of RMS. For the Entropy models, estimating the
marginal effect is slightly simpler as the dependent variable is expressed in levels; that is the model
is in the form y = µRMS, and therefore ∂y/∂RMS = µ.
19With respect to the existing empirical literature, this result confirms, using a European sample
of both LCCs and FSCs, the findings by Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) obtained from a US sample
of only FSCs.
20The brand effect is sustainable if the firm is able to discriminate customers with respect to
their brand preferences (Borenstein, 1985) and, hence, frequent flyer programs represent a typical
tool to make passengers loyal to the brand.
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price variation respectively at the upper and at the lower tail of the distribution.
If the monopoly effect occurs, the price variation of the upper part of the distri-
bution (price inelastic consumers) should be larger than the price variation of the
lower part of the distribution (price elastic consumers). Therefore, if the monopoly
effect occurs, as we increase the choice parameter of the dispersion index, we should
observe a mounting effect of market share on IPD under the Atkinson index spec-
ification, whilst a lowering effect under the Entropy index specification. Focusing
our discussion on the fixed effect estimates of tables 3 and 4, we precisely observe
this pattern, with only one minor exception as we shift from model Entropy(1)
to model Entropy(2); nonetheless, the estimated coefficient on market share under
model Entropy(2) is half the coefficient estimated under model Entropy(0).
A further test of the notion that IPD is generally motivated by passengers’ het-
erogeneity is provided by the analysis of the dummies identifying two peak periods.
Across all specifications the coefficients on the two holiday dummies, Xmas and
Easter, are negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting that for flights
departing during the Christmas or Easter period fares are less dispersed than the
average. During such periods, the airline appear to charge a high fare throughout
the 52 days before departure. That is, the gap between the max and the min fares
shrinks during those holiday periods, implying a less dispersed fare distribution than
in “normal” periods. We call this airlines’ practice “inter-period” price discrimina-
tion, as different types of passengers are identified according to their chosen traveling
period. Moreover, the higher absolute magnitude in most of the cases21 of the Xmas
coefficient over the Easter coefficient proves that the inter-period effect is stronger
during Christmas than during Easter. This result most likely reflects an obvious
presumption on travelers’ ranking of holiday preferences. That is, most Irish people
living in Britain and Britons living in Ireland would consider Christmas as the most
important occasion to reunite with friends and family.
The positive and statistically significant sign on Frequency indicates that flight
services operated daily are more price dispersed than flight services operated with
less frequency. Interestingly a steeper fare distribution on daily flights can be ex-
plained by a rise either in the high tail of the daily flights or in the low tail of less
frequent flights. The former case occurs if we assume that more flight frequency im-
proves the convenience of traveling on the route and that price inelastic consumers
are willing to pay an extra for such increased product quality.22 The latter case
occurs when, due to lower supply, price elastic bookers of less frequent flights have
few flight alternatives and thus accept a higher fare.23 However, given the two dec-
21The two cases out of 14 in which the order is reversed correspond to the only two cases in
which Xmas is statistically insignificant.
22This case is in line with Borenstein and Rose (1994, page 660) who argue that “under monopoly-
type discrimination, improvements in the service would then imply increased price discrimination.”
23Recall that the price elastic bookers are those who shop around, across different departure
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imal digits of the coefficient, the effect of Frequency on IPD in magnitude terms is
relatively small.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on Flights indicates that
routes served by a larger amount of flights show more price dispersion. Although
a similar argument to Frequency may apply, the magnitude of the coefficient on
Flights is so small across all the specifications that its actual impact on IPD be-
comes negligible.
With Ryanair as the omitted airline, the negative coefficient on all the remaining
company dummies in the Pooled model indicates that Ryanair has on average the
highest degree of fare dispersion in our sample, as initially indicated in Table 2.
The route dummies, not reported to save space but included in the Pooled model,
show also a stable and interesting pattern. Setting Stansted-Dublin as the omitted
category, all the remaining route dummies are positive and statistically significant
except Heathrow-Dublin, which is negative and statistically significant. This result
indicates that in markets which are smaller than the London-Dublin one, competitive
forces are probably weaker and airlines fully implement IPD, especially by lifting the
upper part of the fare distribution to take advantage of price inelastic consumers.
On the contrary, in the London-Dublin market each consumer group faces a variety
of imperfect substitutes, which constrains the airlines’ ability to engage in price
discrimination. Henceforth, this will be referred to as the “London-Dublin effect”.
From the variables controlling for the time of departure we deduce that flights
scheduled to depart in the evening have the least dispersed fare distribution. Given
that our sample is composed by very short haul routes with an average journey of
about an hour, it generally appears more convenient for consumers to fly in the
evening, as they can travel off office hours and/or use more efficiently their time
during the day. Such improvement in the quality of the product is acknowledged by
a rise in the passengers’ reservation price. Therefore, since the demand of evening
flights is composed by a smaller amount price elastic consumers, the airline can
increase the lower bound of the fare distribution and still make sales. All else being
equal, an upper lift of the lower bound of the distribution means less dispersion.24
We will refer to this case as the “evening-effect”.
5 Robustness
The investigation of the previous section has found empirical evidence in favor of
a positive and significance effect of competitive forces on price dispersion. In this
days in order to obtain the lowest fare. If a flight code is operated with less frequency, then they
have less options to choose and hence they cannot be too rigid on their reservation price.
24As argued by Borenstein and Rose (1994), evening flights could also be associated with airport
congested periods and thus with more expensive slots. More costly flights are normally allocated
fewer discount tickets, resulting in a higher average fare and a flatter fare distribution.
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section we provide additional evidence to support this result: we control for the
possible endogeneity bias using instrumental variables; we re-estimate the model
under a broader definition of route, the city pair; we employ different alternative
functional forms; we replicate the model on another data set of airline fares. To save
space, and to account for possible correlation between our regressors and the fixed
effect ρi, in the remainder of the paper we report only the Panel Fixed Effects (FE)
coefficients (the Pooled estimates are available on request).
5.1 Instrumental Variables
However, it is possible that RMS may be correlated with the it, so that the potential
endogeneity may bias the results previously presented. Therefore, we re-estimate
equation (1) with Instrumental Variables (IVs), using the IV in Borenstein (1989)
and Borenstein and Rose (1994) (henceforth, B&R).
Table 5 reports the fixed effect estimates using the IV of B&R, corresponding
to the ratio between the observed carrier’s geometric mean of the enplanement (i.e.
the number of passengers boarding the aircraft) at the endpoints of the route and
the sum across all carriers of the geometric mean of each carrier’s enplanement at
the endpoints.25
The IV analysis confirms all the main empirical results and implications of the
previous section. Indeed, market share stays positive across all specifications and
statistically significant five times out of seven. Tables 5 also shows results consistent
with previous findings. The holiday dummies, Xmas and Easter, remain negative
and practically always highly statistically significant, confirming that during the
peak of the holiday season IPD is lower. This result confirms that airlines appear
to practice some forms of inter-period price discrimination to channel price elastic
passengers to the off-peak period and screen the price inelastic consumers into the
peak period where airline can extract higher surplus. Frequency and Flights remains
positive, statistically significant and with the usual low effect in magnitude terms.
The evening-effect, i.e., lower price dispersion for evening flights, seems to fade under
the IV estimation: the sign of the coefficient is still negative 12 times out of 14, but
statistically significant only five times. Given that the time table of each flight
service has normally minor changes during the year (usually associated with the
change of the season) and given that the FE bases its estimation on the deviation
25In formula:
GENPSH =
√
ENP x1 ∗ ENP x2∑
y
√
ENP y1 ∗ ENP y2
where x indexes the observed airline, y indexes all the airlines, ENPy1 and ENPy2 are airline
y’s monthly enplanement at endpoint 1 and at endpoint 2, respectively. The higher the airport
dominance (measured by GENPSH) of a given airline, the higher the likelihood that the observed
airline dominates (i.e. it has a high market share on) the observed route.
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from the within group mean, the estimates of variables characterized by very little
time-variation, such as Evening, are not entirely reliable. Furthermore, the Pooled
estimate of Evening, not reported in table 5, is negative and statistically significant
across all specifications and thus provides yet some support in favor of the evening-
effect. The route dummies of the Pooled estimation are also in line with the results
of table 3 and corroborate the London-Dublin effect. Finally the company dummies
of the Pooled estimation are also unchanged and thus indicate that in our sample
Ryanair is on average the carrier with the highest price dispersion, while British
Airways the carrier with the lowest.
5.2 City pair
Since flights to different airports in the same metropolitan area could be consid-
ered imperfect substitutes and thus compete with one another, equation (1) is re-
estimated under the city pair definition. Formally a city pair includes all the airports
serving a given metropolitan area and defines the relevant market as the combination
of all airport pairs available between two cities.26
Because under city pair the number of markets reduces, when assessing the mag-
nitude of the effect of market share on IPD it is advisable to consider, in addition to
the usual regression estimates, the standardized beta coefficients, which are obtained
from a regression of IPD where all the variables including the market share, taken
separately for the city pair and the route dimension, are normalized with mean zero
and variance equal to 1. To facilitate comparability of results under the two possible
measures of market share, table 6, as well as reporting the estimates using the actual
values of all regressors, includes in square brackets the estimated beta coefficients
relative both to the city pair and the route normalized variables.
Consistent with previous results, the coefficient on market share is positive and
highly significant across all specifications; furthermore, the beta coefficient under
the city pair dimension is consistently higher than the corresponding beta coefficient
under the route dimension. Such a result indicates that the effect of competition
on price dispersion is stronger in magnitude when we take the city pair instead of
the route as the relevant market. This is most likely due to the different possible
market configurations that may characterize a route and a city pair. Consider the
following three types of routes: (i) routes that show some extent of competition
among firms, defined as “competitive-route”, (ii) routes that are close to a monopoly
26We identify six city pairs for the UK, while none for the Republic of Ireland. The airports
associated to each city pair are in parentheses: East Midlands (Birmingham and Nottingham),
London (City, Gatwick, Heathrow, Luton and Stansted), North East (Newcastle and Teesside),
North West (Blackpool, Liverpool and Manchester), Scotland (Edinburgh and Glasgow) and Wales
(Bristol and Cardiff). Therefore, for example, the city pair London - Dublin includes all the airports
in the London area (City, Gatwick, Heathrow, Luton and Stansted) and the only airport in the
Dublin area (Dublin Airport).
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under the route dimension, but that turn into competitive-routes under the city pair
dimension and are referred to as “weak-monopoly”, (iii) routes that are close to a
monopoly under the route dimension and that remain as such also under the city
pair dimension, which we define “strong-monopoly”. Thus, a high market share
under the city pair specification implies a genuinely dominant position of the airline
on the market which is then tantamount to the strong-monopoly case. In such a
market the firm does not suffer from the competition of other flights operated by
other airlines on the same city pair and pricing is driven by the monopoly effect.
Interestingly, we observe a larger effect in the magnitude of the city pair market
share on IPD relative to the case of the route market share, which is a consequence
of the fact that airlines adjust their fares more freely when they enjoy a higher
degree of market power.
Finally, we note that the sign and significance of the other regressors remain very
similar to the results of the IV analysis.
5.3 Functional Forms
We also explore whether different functional forms may affect our results by running
the following alternative specifications of equation (1):
1. Use the natural logarithm of market share in place of RMS.
2. Include the market share of the nearest competitor.
3. Include one dummy for monopoly routes and one dummy for duopoly routes,
as in Borenstein and Rose (1994).27
Log of market share - Table 7: the positive coefficient on the logarithm of
market share across all specifications confirms the positive impact of market share
on IPD.28
Competitor’s market share - Table 8: as expected, when we include the
market share of the nearest competitor, the sign is positive for RMS and negative
for the nearest competitor’s market share; a larger market share of the competitor
erodes the observed carrier’s market power and constrains its ability to adopt pricing
strategies that increase dispersion. Although the inevitable correlation between the
observe carrier’s market share and the nearest competitor’s market share may affect
the significance of RMS, the estimates of table 8 confirm the positive relationship
between firm’s market power and price dispersion.
27Monopoly is defined as a route in which a single airline has a market share of at least 90%.
Duopoly is a non-Monopoly route in which two airlines have a joint market share of at least 90%.
28We have run a regression including a linear and a quadratic term for RMS: although we get
qualitatively similar results, these estimates are not reported given the high collinearity between
RMS and RMS2. These estimates are available on request.
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Monopoly and Duopoly dummies - Table 9: As previously stated, the
features of the UK-Irish airline market, which is characterized by the presence of
few companies on each route, make it difficult to include in the model more than
one variable to control for the different aspects of market structure. Therefore,
we omit the market share variable and replace it with two measures of market
concentration, Monopoly and Duopoly. The positive and sometimes significant sign
for the former and the generally negative and significant one for the latter further
support the prevalence of the monopoly effect. Moreover, the Duopoly coefficient in
the Atkinson index regressions increases in magnitude but loses significance as the
index gives more weight to the upper end of the fares distribution, i.e., as φ increases.
The opposite occurs in the Entropy index regression: both results suggest that the
dispersion of fares is smaller in Duopoly markets.
5.4 International Passenger Survey
To assess the reliability of our results obtained using on-line fares, we re-estimate
our model using a new sample of fares from actual transactions. This new data
set is taken from the International Passenger Survey (IPS),29 which is a survey of
a random sample of passengers entering/leaving the UK by air. The questionnaire
data provide useful information on the expenditure levels of inbound and outbound
tourists and includes, in addition to the route and the carriers’ name, the fare paid
by each interviewed passenger. Similar to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s
Origin and Destinations database, the IPS survey does not indicate the date the
ticket was purchased; however, considering that the survey consists of a random draw
of passengers, we can reasonably assume that IPS fares are randomly distributed
across the booking periods and that therefore IPS fares to a great extent replicate
the booking pattern of our online fares.
Equation (1) is therefore re-estimated using the IPS fares pertaining to all the
UK-Ireland routes for the same sample period of the previous analysis, namely from
June 2003 to December 2004. Due to lack of information, i, the panel identifier, is
now represented by the pair airline-route and t, the time frame, is set monthly.30
As a consequence, the new equation to be estimated is a slightly modified version
of equation (1), because we do not define the time of the flight departure and the
holiday dummies. Furthermore, the variable “Frequency” now comprises the total
number of flights operated by a given airline in a given month on a given route.
29The data set is provided by UK Office for National Statistics and distributed by the UK Data
Archive.
30The IPS provides also the flight code associated with each passenger and therefore potentially
equation (1) could be estimated using the flight code as panel identifier. In practice, however, the
number of fare observations for each combination flight code-month is on average so small that
the dispersion index often cannot be computed. Therefore considering the pair airline-route as the
unit of observation represents the best available approximation.
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Overall, given the different unit of observation, the model specification with the IPS
data allows a reliable comparison with the results previously obtained, especially
considering that the variable of interest, Route Market Share, is taken from the
same source, the UK Civil Aviation Authority. Note also that with respect to our
original sample, this new estimation comprises additional routes and airlines.31
Table 10 reports the results: the statistically significant positive sign on Route
Market Share across all the seven specifications is in line with previous results.
Given the wider set of routes taken into consideration, finding a positive effect
of market share on price dispersion when the dependent variable is obtained from
survey data corroborates the general conclusion from our analysis that the monopoly
effect appears to be prevalent in the UK-Irish airline market.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how competitive forces affect the intertemporal price
dispersion of airline fares. Using different fares posted online at different days before
the departure for 87,601 flights operated between the UK and the Republic of Ireland
during the period 1st June 2003 and 31st December 2004, we have calculated several
indexes of dispersion and tested whether airlines’ market share has a positive or a
negative effect on such price dispersion.
We have found that market share has a positive and statistically significant im-
pact on intertemporal price dispersion and, hence, we provide empirical evidence in
favor of the monopoly effect. We have estimated that for a one-standard-deviation
increase of market share, price dispersion would raise between 0.02 and 0.16, de-
pending on the measure of dispersion considered. This result occurs because a
higher market share allows the airline to separate price inelastic passengers, who are
mostly late bookers, from price elastic passengers, who are typically early bookers,
and accordingly charge a higher price to the former group.
In high-demand periods, when the airline can focus their pricing strategies on a
specific group of passengers with high willingness to pay, we have also found that
fares of flights departing during the weeks of Christmas and Easter are on average
less dispersed. This result is consistent with an inter-period price discriminatory
strategy, where the lower bound of the fare distribution during the peak period is
raised, leading to an overall reduction in fare dispersion.
The conclusions of our econometric analysis are robust to different specifications,
to several functional forms, to the use of instrumental variables; furthermore, the
31In addition to the airlines in table 2, the IPS survey includes passengers flying with Arann
Express, British European and Cityjet. Additional routes not in our previous analysis are:
Birmingham-Cork, Birmingham-Knock, Birmingham-Shannon, East Midlands-Knock, Gatwick-
Cork, Heathrow-Shannon, Luton-Dublin, Luton-Galway, Manchester-Galway and Manchester-
Knock.
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conclusions do not change when we calculate the indexes of fare dispersion using the
fares paid by passengers participating to the UK International Passenger Survey.
Because of its focus on the UK-Irish market, the analysis also sheds further light
on the possible consequences of the attempted takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair,
which was blocked because the acquisition would have significantly impeded effective
competition by creating a dominant position of the combined entity on 35 routes
from and to Dublin, Shannon and Cork, and the creation or strengthening of a
dominant position on 15 other routes from and to Dublin and Cork. (European
Commission, 2007, p. 345). Particularly important to our analysis is the fact that
out of the 35 intra-European routes operated by both parties, the acquisition would
have led to monopoly in 22 routes, and to a dominant position with a joint market
share of more than 60% on the remaining routes.32 Thus, the evidence in this paper
generally lends support to the European Commission’s decision, although the latter’s
investigation did not explicitly address the relationship between fare dispersion and
market concentration. Indeed, because the monopoly effect appears to be associated
with an increase in the fares in the upper end of the distribution, while fares in the
lower end remain largely stable except in holiday periods, the takeover would have
been particularly harmful to certain segments of consumers - in this particular case,
those with uncertain demand whose need to book a flight is generally revealed just
a few days prior to a flight’s departure.
32The Commission’s analysis considers also other European markets outside the British Isles.
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7 Appendix: Sources of Data
This empirical investigation uses two main data sets, one containing primary data on
posted fares, the other providing market structure measures derived from secondary
data provided by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
All the fares are obtained from the internet using a web spider, which accessed the
web-sites of the LCCs included in the sample (Ryanair, Bmibaby and Mytravellite),
and retrieved the fares of the FSCs, namely Aer Lingus and British Airways, from
an on-line travel agent, Opodo.33 For each day between 1st June 2003 and 31st
December 2004 and for each flight code, the spider collected all the posted fares
that a hypothetical consumer would pay when buying the ticket 7, 10, 14, 21, 28,
35, 42, 49 and 56 days before the departure day.
LCCs price each leg independently and the retrieved fares refer to a single one-
way ticket. FSCs, instead, reflect a more sophisticated yield management technique
that usually makes it uneconomical for the consumers to buy each leg indepen-
dently.34 Therefore, for the FSCs the spider collects round-trip fares, which could
be considered more representative of the actual fare pattern observed by consumers.
Furthermore, because the LCCs’ fares do not include such restrictions as Saturday-
night stay over, the spider is programmed to have the return leg scheduled one week
after the outgoing flight. To make a round trip fare comparable with a LCC one-
way fare, we follow the traditional approach in the literature to halve the former
(Borenstein, 1989; Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Before we do so, we deal with the
fact that each first leg could be combined with different return flights, each differing
by departure time. The spider retrieved all these possible combinations of fares,
which we use to construct a daily average round-trip fare.
The UK Civil Aviation Authority provides census monthly data for the full
set of flights operated between the UK and Ireland during the period June 2003 -
December 2004. This data set contains information on the frequency, the number
of passengers and the available seat capacity of each flight code, which are used to
construct various market structure variables.
33See www.opodo.co.uk, which is owned and managed by British Airways, Air France, Alitalia,
Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Aer Lingus, Austrian Airlines, Finnair and the global distribution system
Amadeus. Thus, fares listed on Opodo represent the official prices of each airline; although Opodo
may not report promotional offers that an airline may post on its own website.
34FSCs normally price a round-trip ticket cheaper than two separate one-way tickets, so that
consumers have the incentives to purchase round-trip tickets; the airline is thus able to implement
second degree price discrimination (Giaume and Guillou, 2004).
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the measures of price dispersion
Dispersion measure Mean Std. Deviation Observations Min Max
Gini 0.347 0.165 14,435 0 0.875
Atkinson(0.5) 0.144 0.121 14,435 0 0.744
Atkinson(1) 0.313 0.252 14,435 0 0.993
Atkinson(2) 0.546 0.368 14,435 0 1.000
Entropy(0) 0.479 0.518 14,435 0 4.995
Entropy(1) 0.277 0.241 14,435 0 1.864
Entropy(2) 0.329 0.364 14,435 0 4.685
Table 2: Summary statistics of the Gini coefficient across airlines
Airline Mean Std. Deviation Observations Min Max
Aer Lingus 0.190 0.089 3,273 0 0.513
Bmibaby 0.213 0.086 939 0 0.501
British Airways 0.098 0.044 290 0 0.182
MyTravelLite 0.353 0.120 337 0 0.695
Ryanair 0.421 0.141 9,596 0 0.875
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Table 4: Effect of Route Market Share on Intertemporal Price Dispersion - 2nd table
out of 2
Entropy(0) Entropy(1) Entropy(2)
Pooled FE Pooled FE Pooled FE
Route Market Share 0.261*** 0.628*** 0.059* 0.234*** 0.029 0.321***
(0.081) (0.105) (0.035) (0.041) (0.053) (0.059)
Frequency 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Flights 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Midday -0.025*** -0.041** -0.005* -0.017** -0.011** -0.017
(0.006) (0.018) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)
Afternoon 0.137*** 0.036 0.068*** 0.035*** 0.124*** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.032) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Evening -0.073*** 0.005 -0.028*** -0.022 -0.055*** -0.048**
(0.019) (0.034) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
Xmas -0.308*** -0.320*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.212*** -0.213***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Easter -0.140*** -0.150*** -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.111*** -0.119***
(0.049) (0.044) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.030)
Bmibaby -0.857*** -0.468*** -0.725***
(0.085) (0.028) (0.056)
MyTravelLite -0.257*** -0.140*** -0.252***
(0.043) (0.018) (0.028)
Aer Lingus -0.640*** -0.354*** -0.513***
(0.041) (0.016) (0.025)
British Airways -0.576*** -0.312*** -0.349***
(0.055) (0.020) (0.026)
R2 0.547 0.594 0.574 0.632 0.454 0.526
Observations 14,435 14,435 14,435 14,435 14,435 14,435
Dependent variable: Entropy index, measured with three alternative parameters: 0, 1 and 2,
which respectively correspond to models: Entropy(0), Entropy(1) and Entropy(2). Columns
labeled FE report the flight code Fixed Effect estimates. ArriveDepart, monthly dummies and
route dummies are included, but not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by
route-week. Coefficients *** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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